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Do purchasing practices support or undermine the regulation of labor standards in global 
supply chains?  This study offers the first analysis of the full range of supply chain regulatory 
efforts, integrating records of factory labor audits with purchase order microdata.  Studying 
an apparel and equipment retailer with a strong reputation for addressing labor conditions in 
its suppliers, we show that it persuaded factories to improve and terminated factories with 
poor labor compliance.  However, we also find that purchase orders did not increase when 
labor standards improved.  If anything, factories whose standards worsened tended to see 
their orders increase. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this “missing middle” in 
incentives for compliance appears unrelated to any cost advantage of noncompliant factories.  
Instead, lack of flexibility in supplier relationships created obstacles to reallocating orders in 
response to compliance findings.   
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Many firms managing global supply chains have second identities as transnational labor 
regulators.  They ask the factories and farms they purchase from not only to meet technical and 
quality standards, but also to comply with private codes of conduct governing wages, 
occupational health and safety, and other labor standards.  Over the past 25 years, this private 
regulation of labor standards in supply chains has spread, often through activist pressure, to the 
majority of large, branded apparel, electronics, retail, and foodstuffs firms.  These firms sit atop 
supply chains that employ an estimated one in three workers worldwide.2  
Yet firms are not government agencies.  Lacking statutory authority to inspect or penalize 
other firms, their regulatory power comes instead from their behavior as customers.  As standard-
setters, they can shape the goals of private regulation and encourage suppliers to comply.  As 
gatekeepers to large consumer markets, they can reward compliant suppliers with more business 
and punish violators by cutting them out of their supply chains.  This combination of persuasion 
and purchasing decisions—often referred to as sourcing practices or purchasing practices—is 
central to the efficacy of private labor regulation. 
Does the economic behavior of these firms support or undermine private labor 
regulation?  What barriers might prevent the full alignment of purchasing behavior with labor 
standards enforcement?  Despite a growing body of research on private labor regulation, 
remarkably little evidence speaks to these important questions.  This study analyzes a first-of-its-
kind dataset linking detailed factory labor compliance records—including audit results and 
problem-solving activities—to complete microdata on purchases from these same factories by a 
North American brand and retailer.  Drawing on both quantitative and qualitative evidence, we 
offer the first integrated analysis of importer behavior as regulatory activity. 
                                                 
2 ILO “World Employment Social Outlook,” 2015. 
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We argue that purchasing practices can create what we call a “missing middle” in 
incentives for labor compliance.  Importers may support improved labor compliance with 
frequent, low-coercion enforcement measures (persuasion and problem-solving) and rare, high-
coercion measures (terminating orders from poor performers).  However, buyers that seek stable 
commercial relationships with suppliers can simultaneously fail to reward factories that improve 
working conditions.  This argument stands in contrast to a major concern among scholars that 
importers’ ability to nimbly move business from one supplier to another threatens supply chain 
labor standards.  Instead, we suggest that stable commercial relationships can also constrain the 
use of purchasing practices to regulate labor standards in the supply chain, revealing a tradeoff 
that has been obscured in policy and scholarly debates.  
 
Compliance-promoting Incentives in Trading Relationships 
Scholars across industrial relations, sociology, economics, and political science agree that 
importers shape working conditions in exporting factories throughout the world through both 
their regulatory actions and their sourcing practices (Barrientos and Smith 2007; Nadvi 2008; 
Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Mosley 2010; Mayer and Gereffi 2010; Ruwanpura and 
Wrigley 2011; Oka 2012; Locke 2013; Anner, Bair, and Blasi 2013; Weil 2014; Lund-Thomsen 
and Lindgreen 2013; Bartley et. al 2015; Bartley and Egels-Zanden 2015; Distelhorst et al 2015).  
Most studies agree that buyers encourage improvement of labor practices by establishing codes 
of conduct and instructing suppliers on how to comply (Locke, Amengual, & Mangla 2009; 
Locke 2013).   By contrast, scholars disagree about whether buyers use their market power to 
create incentives for compliance or to drive down labor standards.  Some hold that buyers’ 
volatile demand and insistence on lower prices increase the likelihood of labor violations (Vogel 
2005; Anner Bair and Blasi 2013, Locke and Samel 2017).  Others argue that the norms 
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generated by activist campaigns are sufficiently strong that importers use their market power to 
reward factories that perform well in compliance, even if doing so is costly (Greenhill, Mosley, 
and Prakash 2009).   
Despite differences in these views, most studies analyze the “net” incentives around labor 
compliance.  Our analysis begins by unbundling the diverse activities in importers’ regulatory 
toolkits.  First, supply chain regulation involves monitoring suppliers for violations, persuading 
them to improve, and helping them overcome obstacles to compliance.  This persuasion and 
problem-solving may take place through both on-site audits and more informal communications 
with suppliers.   
In addition to persuasion and problem-solving, importers could in theory generate 
incentives for compliance by offering more attractive purchasing contracts to compliant 
exporters.  They could delay orders from noncompliant exporters while waiting for those 
factories to improve or shift production to a more compliant supplier.  Importers can also reward 
factories that improve by awarding them larger purchasing contracts.  Multi-stakeholder 
initiatives have encouraged their members to create such incentives within their ongoing 
business relationships.  For example, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) asks buyers to create 
“positive incentives for suppliers and/or facilities producing in a socially responsible and 
sustainable manner,”3 and to “demonstrate a correlation between purchase orders and supplier 
[labor] evaluation results.”4   
Importers can also create incentives for compliance by terminating business relationships 
with noncompliant suppliers.  Factories that persistently fail to meet legal or customer-defined 
labor standards may be candidates to be replaced with other factories that are either better 
performing or that have the potential to improve.  The significance of being “dropped” to the 
                                                 
3 Fair Labor Association, Principles of Fair Labor & Responsible Sourcing, 2015. 
4 Fair Labor Association, A Guide to FLA Principal Eight, No Date.   
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supplier factory varies with the scale of the business relationship and the difficulty of replacing 
that lost business with other customers.  Terminating noncompliant factories may create 
powerful incentives, but the practice is controversial. After the commercial relationship ends, 
importers no longer have leverage to demand improvements in working conditions, leaving 
vulnerable employees behind. 
The regulatory activity of lead firms can be organized within the Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992) ideal-typical framework of a regulatory pyramid.  It places enforcement actions along a 
spectrum ranging from frequent, low-coercion behaviors to rare, coercive measures.  Persuasion 
and problem-solving are low-coercion regulatory activities, whereas reducing purchasing from 
factories that fail to comply is a more coercive, stronger incentive (assuming that factories prefer 
that their customers purchase more, not less).  At the most extreme, a buyer can terminate a 
business relationship with a factory, formally taking it out of its supply chain.  Termination is the 
most coercive measure an importer can take, since, unlike government regulators, it cannot levy 
fines or prosecute noncompliant factories.   
 Although most previous research focuses on “net” incentives, some recent studies focus 
more narrowly on some of the behaviors discussed above. Malesky and Mosley (2018) offer 
survey evidence showing that Vietnamese exporters report higher willingness to invest in labor 
compliance in order to do business with importers that provide higher price mark-ups.  
Distelhorst and Locke (2018) found that exporters across 36 countries were, on average, 
rewarded by increased purchasing when they improved compliance with social standards.  Oka 
(2012) shows that compliance with certain labor standards, such as health and safety, enabled 
factories in Cambodia to secure long-term sourcing relationships with reputation-conscious 
buyers.  On the other hand, Bartley & Egels-Zandén (2015) offer a pessimistic view on 
terminations, providing examples of Indonesian factories that permitted the establishment of 
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trade unions, but were then unable to retain their foreign customers and ultimately closed down.  
Their finding aligns with interview evidence from Sri Lankan apparel managers, who reported 
that importers demanded compliance but offered little in return (Ruwanpura and Wrigley 2011, 
ILO 2017).  These studies and others find strong decoupling of compliance activities from 
sourcing practices (Egels-Zadén 2007).  The contradictory results of previous research suggest 
that much remains unknown about the relationship between sourcing practices and labor 
compliance 
Rather than focusing on one aspect of the importer-exporter relationship, our study 
contributes an integrated picture of private regulatory efforts, examining persuasion, order 
allocation, and factory termination decisions together.  These behaviors, and their alignment or 
misalignment, are important because each could either contribute to or undermine the overall 
efficacy of private regulation of labor standards.   
 
Research Design: Labor Compliance and Purchasing at Active Inc. 
We studied purchasing and compliance at a North American brand of athletic apparel and 
equipment that we call Active Incorporated (a pseudonym) over 2012-2015. Active has a 
reputation as a leader in environmental and social standards.  Like many retailers and brands, 
Active developed an internal private regulatory system for labor standards in its supply chain.  It 
adopted a supplier code of conduct in the 1990s and is among the small minority of firms that 
participates in multi-stakeholder initiatives to improve working conditions in global supply 
chains.      
At the time of this study, Active had a supply chain of approximately 70 factories and 
about $350 million in revenue each year from all sales.5   Due to its size, Active differs from the 
                                                 
5 Active sourced from factories in the following countries: Canada, China, El Salvador, Hong Kong, India, Korea, 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, and Vietnam.  
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extremely large companies such as Nike that have been the subject of most research on private 
regulation.  Lessons from large firms are important because these firms capture a large amount of 
market share, but the largest firms are, by definition, atypical.  Participation in private regulation 
includes many mid-size and smaller firms with valuable brands that seek to cultivate reputations 
for social and environmental responsibility and head-off activist pressures.  For example, the 
median firm in the Fair Labor Association has just 51 suppliers, and many members manage 
supply chains smaller than that of Active (see Appendix).   
Factories that manufacture Active’s products are subject to third-party audits before 
joining the supply chain and at least once every 18 months thereafter. When audits detect 
violations, Active creates correction action plans (CAPs) that detail the violations and make 
remediation plans. These CAP records also contain observations of Active staff during non-audit 
visits and records of communication by email and phone between Active’s compliance staff and 
factory management.6  These records capture many of the persuasive and problem-solving 
activities of Active’s compliance staff. 
Active’s approach to labor compliance emphasizes improvement.7 The CAP documents 
therefore contain detailed records of violations, root causes, proposed corrective actions, and 
progress to completion.  To measure compliance in supplier factories over time, the research 
team hand-coded individual violations from several hundred CAP documents.  The resulting data 
set covers compliance activity over the period of 2012 to 2015.8  In total, it tracks 1,940 
violations detected in Active supplier factories through 7,166 events—mostly audits and post-
                                                 
6 For example, when factories have violations that relate to their policies or lack of documentation, managers will 
send this information to Active’s compliance team electronically.  In these circumstances, Active will designate a 
violation provisionally closed until the following audit. 
7 Since 2014 Active have also given strategic partner factories scores in twice-yearly evaluations. We do not use 
these scores for the quantitative analyses because they cover a subset of factories and are not available for the earlier 
periods of purchasing data.  
8 For some factories, earlier data were also available.  We used these data in factory vignettes but trimmed the data 
from our quantitative analyses to include only seasons in which we had full records across all active factories.  
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audit communications between Active and the factories—from either the initial detection date of 
the violation or the start of our data.   
Table 1: Labor Violations by Season 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Spring Fall Spring Fall Spring Fall Spring 
Total audits 20 13 27 27 19 18 22 
Avg violations 6.99 8.07 7.62 6.82 5.48 5.42 5.58 
        
By type…        
  Wages 1.03 1.08 1.14 1.04 0.74 0.72 0.62 
  Benefits 0.3 0.31 0.3 0.29 0.27 0.35 0.4 
  Work hours 0.9 0.91 0.84 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.89 
  Health 4.1 4.97 4.61 4.1 3.31 3.07 3.21 
  Other 0.66 0.8 0.73 0.62 0.43 0.43 0.44 
Notes. Table reports average unremediated violations each season in factories producing 
for Active.  In addition to audits, Active uses factory visits by production staff and 
communication with factory management to assess compliance between audits.  We use 
all three sources of information to determine what Active believed about compliance in 
its suppliers throughout the study. 
 
Compliance trends at Active’s supplier factories appear in Table 1. Average open 
violations at each factory during each season vary between 5.4 and 8.1, declining slightly over 
the period. Two-thirds of the labor violations in our data were considered corrected by Active 
staff during our study period.  One-third were never resolved, either because commercial 
relations with the factory were terminated or the violation continued to be unresolved as of the 
last observation analyzed in our study.  These levels of non-compliance are similar to those 
found in other research studying labor standards in global value chains, suggesting that Active’s 
suppliers are not unusual in either non-compliance or compliance (Toffel Short & Oullett 2015).   
Audit data offers only an imperfect measure of factory compliance, and is especially 
problematic in assessing process rights such as freedom of association (Anner 2012). Our 
analysis focuses on how Active’s regulatory practices respond to information about factory 
compliance. Active’s internal compliance records are a major source of information available to 
managers and are therefore an appropriate measure, even if there is error in measuring the true 
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working conditions.  Active’s managers were also aware that 1-2 day audits cannot offer a 
holistic picture of an ever-changing working environment. 
What distinguishes our study from past research on the regulatory activities of lead firms 
is access to Active’s purchase order database, summarized in Table 2.  Active purchases an 
average of 28 million dollars of products from these suppliers per season.  Unlike previous 
studies of purchasing behavior (e.g. Distelhorst and Locke 2018), we observe the date, price, and 
volume of each order.     
Table 2: Purchase Orders by Season 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 Full 
 Spring Fall Spring Fall Spring  Fall Spring period 
Units (million) 1.83 1.48 2.00 1.60 1.55 1.69 1.57 11.72 
Cost (million USD) 26.6 27.7 28.4 33.1 21.3 35.0 23.6 195.8 
         
Factories 70 74 69 74 63 74 73 106 
Purchase orders 968 767 873 923 860 1046 991 6403 
SKUs 6569 4876 6108 5391 4398 6160 6181 27765 
Share of purchase value         
  Apparel 61% 49% 50% 45% 43% 55% 56% 51% 
  Backpacks 16% 10% 22% 13% 19% 9% 12% 14% 
         
  China factories 33% 47% 28% 54% 35% 53% 41% 43% 
  India 17% 7% 14% 4% 11% 3% 10% 9% 
  Thailand 7% 6% 9% 5% 3% 6% 7% 6% 
  Vietnam 16% 22% 29% 17% 25% 17% 20% 21% 
 
We combined these data with records of Active’s low-coercion regulatory activities to 
persuade and instruct suppliers on compliance.  Finally, we supplemented these data with 
interviews of Active managers involved in both compliance and sourcing, providing insight on 
organizational processes during the period we study.  We cite each interview with a code and 
provide details in the Appendix.  These sources of data allow us to reconstruct the full sequence 
of regulatory events, from audits to post-audit communications to sourcing decisions and the 
termination of factories from the supply chain.  Of course, organizational practices evolve over 
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time, and this study focuses only on the period of 2012-2015, for which we had complete records 
of sourcing and compliance audits.   
 Regulatory Activity Across the Pyramid:  Two Factory Examples 
What happens when labor violations are discovered at supplier factories?  Before 
presenting quantitative analyses, we examine two supplier factories to Active.9 These vignettes, 
developed from interviews with Active staff and documentary evidence from purchase orders 
and corrective action plans,10 illustrate occasionally puzzling and contradictory combinations of 
regulatory actions, setting the stage for quantitative analyses in the following sections. 
Factory 2 
Factory 2 is an apparel factory in Asia that manufactured jackets, pants, and sweatshirts 
for Active since 2009.   It was also one of Active’s largest suppliers of apparel; in spring 2012, it 
received orders worth $2.1 million.  Yet Factory 2 also had significant labor standards violations; 
five related to health and safety, four related to working hours, two in employee benefits, and 
two in wages.  At thirteen total violations, the factory had nearly double the average of all 
factories in that season.  Moreover, the factory had taken no meaningful steps to remediate 
several of these violations for over one year. 
Over the next two years, Active worked with Factory 2 to make progress in reducing 
violations.  Internal records show compliance staff in regular communication with factory 
management, recommending specific remedies to violations.  Factory management responded to 
these suggestions, taking concrete actions such as training supervisors.  A new audit in April 
2013 revealed that the total number of violations dropped to five.  In the following months, 
                                                 
9 We selected these cases based on the following criteria.  First, to improve external validity we focus on apparel 
factories that are typical of those studied in the literature on private regulation.  Second, we choose factories that had 
a long relationship with Active, thereby allowing us to observe multiple rounds of interaction between Active and 
the factory.  Third, we choose one factory that Active terminated for compliance reasons, and another that was not 
dropped for compliance reasons.  This selection provided variation on one dependent variable of interest.   
10 Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are directly from the corrective action plan documents, either from auditor 
reports or communication between Active and the factory management. 
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Active’s records show compliance personnel recognizing the factory for further reducing 
violations.  Active staff visited the factory to encourage additional actions and, in mid-2014, 
Factory 2 had successfully remediated all violations detected in the previous audit.   
Figure 1: Factory 2 Compliance and Sourcing Volume 
 
Did purchasing decisions align with the efforts of Active’s compliance staff?  The 
purchase order data shows no response to changes in compliance.  Orders over 2012-2014 
remained comparable year-to-year (Figure 1).  When Factory 2 achieved full compliance in 2014 
it also received its lowest seasonal order total ($1.5 million).   Nor was there any change in unit 
prices that could have benefitted the factory without increasing volume. 
In a new audit in October 2014, Active’s auditors found twelve violations at Factory 2, 
revealing excessive overtime and insufficient days of rest. The factory used illegal fines to 
punish workers and paid below standards for annual leave, a form of wage theft.  Most 
troublingly, auditors found that the factory had falsified work hours records to deceive auditors. 
Quality inspection records showed workers inspecting production on Sundays, but the documents 
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provided to auditors showed no one working on those days.  The auditor noted, “weekly working 
hours, daily and monthly overtime hours, weekly rest, minimum wage and overtime premium 
could not be verified effectively.”  The factory claimed an innocent error, but Active designated 
this violation “unacceptable” and triggered an immediate escalation.  
Purchasing from Factory 2 continued as usual despite these revelations.  Shortly after the 
audit five purchase orders were placed between October 22 and November 20.  Orders over the 
next three months totaled $2.3 million, comparable to the value of the previous Fall season 
(Figure 1). These do not appear to be rush orders that needed to be placed immediately.  Only 
3% of the units were scheduled for delivery by March 2015, and 88% were scheduled to arrive 
after July 2015.11   
Yet Active by no means ignored the new violations.  The compliance team took extensive 
actions to persuade factory management to change their practices, holding an onsite meeting with 
factory management about records falsification shortly after the audit.  In the following month, 
Active communicated regularly with factory management as it worked through the remediation 
process.  The factory progressed on a number of issues: beginning air quality checks, changing 
the way it calculated payments, and adopting new management systems to address overtime and 
health and safety issues.  A follow-up audit occurred in January 2015, and Active expressed 
satisfaction with the factory’s management of work hours and wrote: “Please continue your 
effort.”  The auditor also investigated the false records issue, in part by reviewing security video 
and crosschecking production and hours records.  The violations appeared to be resolved and, 
soon after, Active wrote the factory stating, “We appreciate your effort and confirm the 
transparency item is closed.”   
                                                 
11 Delaying orders is possible in some cases.  In the previous fall season, most orders were sent in November, but an 
additional order was added in January with a short turnaround time (53 days on average).  A delay contingent on 
demonstrating improvement is a reasonable counterfactual. 
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Active’s records indicate the factory resolved all but one of its violations over the 
following six months. In May 2015, Active placed $1.2 million in seasonal orders. Compliance 
staff continued to work closely with factory management, and the factory shared internal data on 
work hours and social insurance payments in July 2015. Active projected $2.4 million in order 
volume for fall 2015, and shared this projection with the factory in its scorecard.  
Despite the factory’s progress, the projected orders were never placed.  Factory 2 
received only $18,000 in orders in late 2015.  Shortly thereafter, Active removed it from its list 
of approved factories, cutting it off from future orders.  Active’s documents show that 
compliance staff commended factory management, writing in the factory’s scorecard: “Factory 2 
has shown good progress on the [corrective action plan] to date, and is encouraged to continue 
ongoing efforts to decrease overtime hours.”  Yet, Active’s internal records also noted the 
factory’s low performance on quality and, especially, on-time delivery.   
In our interviews, staff recounted Active’s main motivation for pulling out of the factory 
was a change in factory management, which resulted in declining product quality and the 
factory’s inability to meet delivery schedules (B02).  Documentary evidence is consistent with 
this account, suggesting that neither price nor the desire for improved compliance drove the 
decision.  Many of the products that Factory 2 produced were discontinued,12 but one product 
that moved to a new factory became 4.3% more expensive than it was at Factory 2, suggesting 
that price was not the driver.13  The factory that took over Factory 2’s styles had more open 
compliance violations (seven).   In fact, compared to other apparel suppliers, Factory 2 did not 
have a high number of violations, especially during the end of the period (Figure 1).   
                                                 
12 We searched Active’s purchase order database for any orders including a SKU that had, at any time, been 
produced by Factory 2 and another factory.  Only one product met this criterion. 
13 The previous year, Factory 2 increased the price of this garment by 1.4%.  Thus, while there was a positive trend 
in prices across seasons, it was greater when Active moved production to a new factory. 
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In Factory 2, we observe extensive persuasive and problem-solving actions by Active’s 
compliance team, but no use of purchase orders to reward compliance or punish violations.  
During the sourcing relationship, Active’s orders continued no matter whether the factory 
improved or declined in labor compliance.  If anything, by placing large orders just after auditors 
discovered serious issues, purchasing behavior may have sent mixed messages to the factory and 
undermined the goals of compliance staff to improve labor conditions.  The factory was later 
terminated for commercial reasons (unrelated to price) just when labor compliance appeared to 
be improving.   
 Factory 101 
Not every sourcing relationship followed this pattern. Factory 101 is also an apparel 
factory in the same Asian country as Factory 2, manufacturing jackets, sweats, jerseys, and pants 
for Active since 2011.  It was among the most non-compliant factories in Active’s supply chain.  
An audit in November 2012 revealed 17 unresolved violations, including seven deemed “high 
risk.”  Violations included excessive overtime, failure to pay overtime premiums, failure to pay 
correctly for worker leaves, and basic health and safety issues. Multiple violations had been 
detected in previous audits but remained unaddressed for over a year.  As occurred in Factory 2, 
auditors also found evidence of attempts to mislead auditors: wage and hours records indicated 
that employees were not working on Saturdays and Sundays, but the production records showed 
that they were working.  Compliance staff implored the factory to be more transparent in regular 
communications with management.  For other violations, communication records reveal that the 
factory management claimed it “did not know the legal requirements” and Active’s compliance 
staff took extensive steps to instruct the factory on how to comply, including multiple in-person 
meetings and engaging with sourcing to develop workplans for remediation.   
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Figure 2: Factory 101 Compliance and Sourcing Volume 
 
 
 
 
The following year, Active audited Factory 101 and confirmed that many of the 
violations previously discovered had not been remediated.  Auditors also discovered new 
“unacceptable” violations; the factory forced its employees to “apply for leave via written 
application form if they did not want to work (overtime) on Saturdays.”  This practice violated 
forced overtime rules, and Active staff communicated to the factory that such practices 
contravened both applicable labor laws and Active’s code of conduct.  The total number of 
unmediated violations increased to 21 after this audit, making Factory 101 the second-most 
noncompliant apparel factory in the supply chain.   
Throughout this period, Active’s social compliance staff repeatedly attempted to 
persuade the factory to change its behavior.  Records from the corrective action plans reveal 
frequent actions by Active’s staff that required substantial staff time to promote compliance.  For 
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instance, Active informed factory management that paying social insurance was “increasingly 
important due to the worker strikes and protests due to not receiving full social insurance 
benefits” and, to stress the negative consequences of violations, sent management articles in the 
press about recent strikes in similar factories that were triggered by social insurance violations.   
While Active took ample low coercion measures to push the factory to comply, we saw 
no evidence that purchasing was reduced as a penalty for these violations.  Purchase orders 
increased from $468,000 in fall 2012 to $543,000 in spring 2013, and $616,000 in fall 2013.14  
Orders in fall 2013 were placed after the audit detecting the forced overtime violations.  Again, 
incentives expressed through purchase orders were, if anything, implicitly rewarding rather than 
punishing a factory whose compliance was deteriorating. 
However, the fall of 2013 was a turning point.  As the factory continually failed to 
remediate violations, purchasing patterns began to change.  In spring 2014, Active dramatically 
reduced orders, placing just $32,000.  A new audit in March 2014 showed very little progress, 
with violations holding steady.  Compliance records from Active show factory management 
resisting Active’s demands to change their labor practices. For example, disciplinary practices at 
Factory 101 included fining workers for errors and failing to record disciplinary actions (which 
prevented auditors from reviewing these practices and assessing compliance).  These practices 
were first identified as problematic in 2011; they were only partially resolved by the 2014 audit.  
Factory management refused to maintain and disclose records of disciplinary actions; the 
manager’s email to Active simply stated, “I will not do this.” In addition, Factory 101 continued 
to refuse auditor access to certain records around hours and rest days. Social compliance staff at 
Active recalled, “We had so many conversations with him…they just weren’t picking it 
up…We’ve tried as much as we can, there [was] no movement” (B03).   
                                                 
14 Orders fell between spring and fall 2012, but our study had access to only limited data on audits prior to fall 2012 
and therefore cannot assess whether this change was in response to shifts in compliance.  
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This deadlock ultimately led to a change in purchasing.  In fall 2014, Active ordered just 
$328,000, less than fall orders the previous two years (Figure 2).  This was the final season in 
which Active placed orders at Factory 101.  In May 2014, social compliance staff emailed 
Factory 101 management explaining that they were ending the relationship due to 
noncompliance (B02).  Staff had already started developing alternative suppliers to take Factory 
101’s products and eventually moved many of its products to a more compliant factory in Latin 
America.15   
Active’s internal documents indicate that Factory 101 was terminated and formally 
removed from its supply chain due to “social compliance” rather than business performance 
considerations.  Further evidence suggests that Active did not change factories because it found a 
cheaper alternative source.  Factory 101 had given Active price reductions of 3% in 2013 and 6% 
in 2014 on products that were later produced by the new factory in Latin America.  By contrast, 
prices on the same products at the new factory either remained constant or increased slightly.  
The move to a more compliant but costlier factory is congruent with Active’s internal records, 
stating that the termination of Factory 101 was motivated by its persistently poor labor 
compliance and unwillingness to improve, rather than by price.  
In sum, Active took many steps to cajole and instruct the factory on how to comply and, 
eventually, penalized persistent noncompliance by terminating the factory. However, during the 
sourcing relationship, orders continued to be placed even as conditions remained poor.  Again, 
the signals sent by purchase orders appeared to undercut the efforts of the compliance team.  
Factory 101 also illustrates the willingness of supplier factories to challenge and refuse the 
requests of labor compliance teams; factory management appeared willing to risk losing Active 
as a customer rather than comply with its requests. 
                                                 
15 Until this point, the replacement supplier had been reasonably compliant with 4 to 8 open violations.  An audit in 
May 2015 discovered 18 violations, but the factory worked quickly to remediate them. Three months after the audit, 
only one open violation remained.   
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How do purchase orders respond to new violations? 
In the factories discussed above, the timing and value of purchases appeared insensitive 
to factory compliance. If anything, purchasing appeared to undermine compliance demands, as 
large orders were placed just after audits that revealed serious violations.  Are the factories above 
unusual, or is this a pattern across the broader population of business relationships? 
If Active used purchase orders to encourage compliance, we expect that factories that 
reduce labor violations should be rewarded with more orders.  Conversely, when labor violations 
increase, orders should decline.  This relationship can be modeled using a standard panel model 
with factory and time-period fixed effects: 
Ordersit =  aViolationsit + bXit + gi + ht + eit 
Order value and violations vary across factories (i) and over time (t).  Time-varying controls 
appear in Xit, the final two terms are factory (gi) and time-period (ht) fixed effects.  Our 
dependent variable is total value of orders placed in the factory during each season (USD).16  The 
factory fixed effects control for time-invariant features of factories, which are especially 
important due to the heterogeneity in product types across Active’s supply chain.  The supply 
chain includes both manufacturers of winter coats (complex and costly) and summer t-shirts 
(simple and inexpensive).  Time-period fixed effects account for trends and shocks that affect all 
factories similarly, such as changes in input costs that affect prices at all factories or fluctuations 
in consumer demand over time that affect quantity demanded by Active. 
To fit this model, we merge our hand-coded factory compliance dataset with information 
from all 6,403 purchase orders placed at Active’s suppliers over three and a half years: January 
2012 to June 2015.  For most products, Active places orders by season and selects factories in 
                                                 
16 This section examines only incentives during the active business relationship.  We therefore treat all seasons after 
the final order placed at each factory as missing, rather than zero.  The following section contains an analysis of 
factory terminations. 
 19 
the previous season (six- to nine-months before issuing the purchase order).  Therefore, we 
construct a seasonal panel (two observations per calendar year) and lag measures of compliance 
by one season to allow sufficient time for orders to respond to information from compliance 
audits.  We operationalize labor violations in two ways.  First, we measure the average violations 
observed within each factory during the previous season (factories could be audited at any time 
within a season).  Second, we use a binary indicator of labor violations that takes the value 1 if 
the factory exhibited greater than the median level of violations across the whole panel and 0 if 
fewer than that median.   
The results of the simple panel model show no evidence of compliance-promoting 
incentives (Table 3, columns 1 and 2).  Instead, we find suggestive evidence of perverse 
incentives.  The sign on both average violations and the binary indicator is positive, and both 
estimates are statistically different from zero.  The coefficient on the binary indicator in column 
(2) shows that increasing violations from the lower half of the distribution to the upper half is 
associated with $243 thousand more orders in the following season (95% C.I. $21 thousand - 
$465 thousand).   
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Table 3: Violations and Order Volumes During the Business Relationship 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged average 24,252*  24,159*  21,919**  
violations (12,610)  (12,738)  (9,832)  
Lagged top 50%  242,946**  243,526**  217,286** 
viols. (binary)  (111,597)  (112,050)  (87,623) 
Average unit price   37.35 202.3 73.53 196.8  
  (179.6) (140.3) (151.2) (145.0) 
Late delivery ratio   61,361 81,186 62,396 97,485  
  (50,458) (48,930) (54,829) (65,050) 
Audited? (binary)     106,108** 112,066**  
    (47,033) (48,167) 
Purchasing manager FE     ü ü 
Factory FE ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Season FE ü ü ü ü ü ü 
R-squared 0.082 0.069 0.083 0.071 0.286 0.278 
Factories 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Observations 435 435 435 435 435 435 
Notes. Panel fixed-effects models of total order volume (USD) in Active Inc sourcing database.  
Violations are a time-varying measure within each factory, averaged within each season.  Top 50% 
violations is a binary indicator of whether factory violations were greater than (1) or less than (0) the 
entire panel median during each season.  Both explanatory variables lagged by one season, as orders are 
assigned to factories roughly six months before purchase orders are issued. Robust standard errors 
clustered by factory in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
One natural question is whether perverse incentives arise because factories that decline in 
compliance are able to improve their prices or product delivery performance.  We explore this 
possibility by adding controls for unit prices and late deliveries.  Average unit prices are obtained 
by dividing seasonal order volume by total units.  On-time delivery performance is measured by 
the generation of backorders—backorders occur when factories inform Active they will be 
unable to fulfill the original purchase order on time.  The ratio of backorders to purchase orders 
therefore offers a measure of late deliveries, and interviews with logistics staff confirmed that 
Active uses this variable when it evaluates factories.  Because these variables are only observed 
when some orders are placed, we fill missing values with the most recently observed unit price 
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or delivery performance (i.e. startpoint imputation).  Results reported in columns (3) and (4) 
suggest that the compliance-orders relationship is not explained by correlated changes in unit 
prices. Introducing these controls has effectively no impact on the estimated effects of labor 
violations on product orders.   
Columns (5) and (6) introduce additional time-varying controls, including an indicator of 
whether the factory was audited during the season and fixed effects for the manager in Active 
who was responsible for the largest spend at each factory in each season.  If orders tended to be 
issued shortly after factory audits, that may explain why violations correlate with order volumes.  
We also expect different managers may have different order placement styles that could explain 
the relationship of orders to violations.  Audits are indeed a significant predictor of purchase 
orders, and the effects of violations attenuate slightly, but the negative association between 
compliance and purchasing remains.    
The Appendix reports additional robustness checks, replicating these results with units 
ordered, using month-level panels, and conducting analysis on a subset of the sample that 
includes only apparel factories.  Although not all models show statistically significant perverse 
incentives, they are generally consistent with the results in Table 3. They never suggest that 
reducing labor violations was associated with increased orders. 
 
Which factories are terminated? 
The analyses above focus on the “middle” of the enforcement pyramid: the possibility of 
rewarding improvement with increased orders.  What about terminations—the strongest 
regulatory response Active can create?  According to Active’s internal records, one in five 
terminated factories were dropped over social compliance concerns, similar to Factory 101 
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above.  Yet this does not tell us whether labor violations were more generally associated with 
termination of the business relationship. 
To measure terminations using the purchase order database, we treat cases in which 
factories received no orders placed over two consecutive seasons (12 months) as a termination.   
Two seasons was chosen because some factories specialize in a certain season, and we confirmed 
this method with Active staff.  Using these criteria, 13 factories (out of a total of 91) were 
terminated in the 30-month purchase order panel, providing a small number of events that we can 
explain with our data. We first examine differences across the binary measure of low- vs. high-
violation factories discussed in the previous section, cutting the sample into two groups around 
the median level of average violations.   
Figure 3. Factory terminations among low- and high-violation factories 
 
Notes. Kaplan-Meier survival plot dividing factories into two equally sized 
groups based on average violations over the study period.  Analysis begins at 
either the start of the panel or when the factory entered the supply chain, 
whichever comes later.  In total, ten factories are terminated from the high-
violation group, compared to three among the low violation group.  Chi-squared 
test for difference in survival rates yields p-value of 0.03. Regression estimates 
corresponding to this analysis appear in Table 5. 
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We find that factories with lower-than-median average violations were more likely to 
remain in Active’s supply chain, with over 90% lasting the entirety of the panel.  By contrast, 
high-violation factories (violations above the median) were terminated more quickly.  After 20 
months, only 85% of the high-violation factories remain in the supply chain.  A Kaplan-Meier 
survival plot appears in Figure 3.  Table 4 presents several regression estimates using both the 
continuous measure of average violations and the binary high-low measure shown in Figure 3.  
We use Cox proportional hazard models that estimate the duration of time elapsed to factory 
terminations.  In addition, we report OLS and logit models of a cross-section of factories, in 
which our dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the factory was dropped, and 0 if it remained 
in the supply chain.  All models indicate that Active is more likely to terminate factories that 
exhibit higher levels of violations. Although the results are imprecise, we never find results that 
suggest that Active is more likely to maintain relationships with factories that have more 
violations.  
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Table 4: Regression estimates of factory terminations and labor violations 
Model type Cox P.H. OLS Logit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
            
Average violations 1.137*** 
 
1.019** 
 
1.131***   
(0.0476) 
 
(0.00846) 
 
(0.0526)  
High violations binary 
 
3.662** 
 
1.163**  3.889* 
(top 50%) 
 
(2.354) 
 
(0.0838)  (2.723) 
       
Constant 
  
1.023 1.069* 0.0658*** 0.0714***    
(0.0567) (0.0402) (0.0360) (0.0429)      
  
Observations 2,589 2,589 91 91 91 91 
R-squared     0.088 0.046 0.0884 0.0593 
Notes. Models of factory termination conditional on labor violations.  Explanatory variables are a 
continuous measure of average violations within the panel and a binary indicator of high-violation 
factories (i.e. in the top 50% of average violations).  Columns (1) and (2) report hazard ratios 
from Cox proportional hazard models, estimated at the factory-month level with robust standard 
errors clustered by factory.  Columns (3) and (4) report OLS estimates at the factory level.  The 
outcome is a binary indicator of whether the factory is terminated during the study.  Columns (5) 
and (6) show logit models of the same binary outcome.  There are thirteen factory terminations in 
the period we observe. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results must be taken with caution and cannot be interpreted causally. Attributes of 
high-violation factories that correlate with violations may increase the risk of termination, such as 
poor performance in quality or on-time delivery (recall that Factory 2 had both spikes in 
violations and business performance issues).  Nonetheless, factories with higher violations are 
also at higher risk of termination.  This contradicts the widely-held view that labor violations 
provide factories with a competitive advantage. 
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Figure 5: Private Regulatory Enforcement at Active Inc. 
 
Notes. Findings summarized in an “enforcement pyramid” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 35) 
 
Why the Missing Middle? 
We analyzed whether Active engaged in three types of regulatory activities—persuasion 
and problem-solving, rewarding improvers with more order volume (or punishing violations by 
reducing orders), and strong penalties in the form of factory terminations.  In both case studies 
and quantitative analysis, we found evidence for low- and high-coercion measures to encourage 
compliance, but no mid-level incentives.  This result is puzzling in light of standard 
explanations.  Conventional accounts emphasizing the costs of compliance predict that highly-
compliant factories will be unable to meet demands around price and delivery, making them less 
attractive than those with more violations (Vogel 2005).  Yet both our evidence and recent 
empirical research17 is inconsistent with the observable implications of this argument.  First, 
controlling for unit prices and on-time delivery has no effect on the estimated relationship 
                                                 
17 Distelhorst and Locke (2018) find, studying a different sample of export manufacturers, that noncompliant 
factories also show inferior performance in quality and on-time delivery metrics (see Table 1). 
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between compliance and order volume.  Nor are these variables predictors of increased orders on 
their own; Active did not increase orders in factories that decreased their prices.  This result 
suggests that the estimated relationship between compliance and purchasing is not explained by 
within-factory fluctuations in price.  Second, if labor compliance put factories at a competitive 
disadvantage and Active was unwilling to bear those costs, we would expect Active to terminate 
compliant suppliers more than noncompliant suppliers.  Yet we find the opposite pattern. 
To better understand why we observe this “missing middle” in private regulatory efforts, 
we turn to interviews with Active Inc management to gain firsthand accounts of organizational 
processes in the period 2012 to 2015.18  These interviews revealed a series of barriers to flexibly 
adjusting order volumes in response to compliance information.  Placing an order involved 
coordination among Active staff members across multiple departments.  Each team signed off on 
different attributes of a purchase order, such as product specifications, projected sales 
(quantities), and the availability and price of inputs.  When describing this process, Active 
managers stated, “[It] takes a village to create a purchase order” (B02).  This coordination took 
place under time pressure to issue orders early enough to allow factories time to source inputs 
needed for manufacturing.  In the final stages of placing an order, “everything is happening 
pretty quickly;” changing orders along the way to adapt to new information about compliance 
required re-engaging in this complex process (B04).   
Purchasing decisions balanced the benefits from economies of scale with the risks if one 
factory failed to deliver.  In the words of one manager, “you want to give the factories steady 
growth, and that is because you want them to reserve capacity for you, but you don’t want to be 
overexposed” (B04).  As a smaller customer, Active also needed to meet the minimum order 
quantity specified by each factory, which made commercial relationships more rigid.  Factories 
                                                 
18 In these interviews, we asked merchants to reflect on sourcing practices during the period we study. More 
recently, Active has introduced new workflows that centralize sourcing decisions.  There was not sufficient data to 
evaluate the effect of organizational changes on the relationship between sourcing and compliance.   
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specify minimum order quantities because producing new styles often leads to periods of 
reduced productivity and higher defect rates. As a mid-sized buyer, these order volume 
requirements were, according to Active management, “the biggest challenge” in negotiating with 
factories (B02).  For this reason, most of Active’s styles were produced in just a single factory.  
To manage risk, Active kept alternative factories in its supply chain that have the capability to 
produce a product in case the focal factory cannot deliver, but there were substantial costs to 
shifting products from one factory to another.  Most importantly, it could take months of 
sampling before a new style could be mass manufactured. 
In light of the complex steps in placing orders and the difficulties of reallocating 
purchases across factories in response to new information, several of Active’s purchasing staff 
simplified compliance into a “go / no-go” binary: either orders could be placed in a factory or 
they could not.  When asked about compliance, one merchant stated, “it is kind of black and 
white, either they pass an audit, or there is a no-go” (B01).  Another manager explained, “my 
understanding is that the factories all have…to comply with a big set of rules…they are 
committed to compliance, they treat their workers well, they maybe belong to the [Fair Labor 
Association]” (B04).  Some managers did not believe that factories with serious compliance 
issues would be in their supply chain because, “we have a solid [social compliance]  team” that 
allows sourcing staff to “focus on the product” as opposed to considering compliance issues on a 
day to day basis (B05).  In short, many staff involved in the purchase order process did not view 
monitoring labor compliance as central to their roles, much less consider setting the terms of 
purchase orders as opportunities to create regulatory incentives.  Compounding the problem, key 
compliance managers were not involved in meetings in which orders were allocated to factories 
to begin the product development calendar (B03). 
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Although the “go / no-go” view of compliance limited use of order volumes to reward 
labor compliance, this view supported the use of factory terminations to enforce standards.  
When compliance staff deemed a factory unable to meet standards despite multiple seasons of 
efforts, Active staff started developing a plan for moving its products to new factories.  Although 
merchants did not seek compliance staff input when setting order volumes, they did pay attention 
when compliance staff raised serious issues.  As one merchant recounted, “It is really when [the 
compliance] team gets a red flag…it gets elevated…and we might pull our business out…it is a 
risk to retail and brands to not be partnered with good factories. We could end up like [another 
brand] did and lose multiple generations” of customers (B04).  This manager went on to state: 
“We had an instance with a factory, when something kind of happened that I wasn’t comfortable 
with, it was a bit of a red line to me, if it wasn’t solved, we would pull out of it” (B04).   
 
Conclusion 
Research on private regulation of labor standards in global supply chains has struggled to 
empirically examine the full range of regulatory actions available to buyers.  We offer a 
conceptualization of the regulatory activities of buyers, ranging from frequent low-coercion 
forms of persuasion, to reallocation of orders, to cutting factories out of supply chains.  By doing 
so, we add nuance to what has been a somewhat unidimensional debate on regulatory activities, 
especially those related to sourcing, of firms.  For instance, Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel envision 
an effective private regulatory regime in which, “knowing that improved working conditions 
would be reported to consumers by credible monitors, manufacturers would have an incentive to 
make improvements” (2001: 81).  Similarly, Greenhill et. al. (2009) theorize that when there is 
activist pressure, “subcontractors in exporting nations will face pressure from actors higher up in 
their supply chain to demonstrate their compliance with national labor laws” (p. 675).  David 
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Vogel (2005) voices the more widespread view that, “…higher labor standards will increase 
production costs, and many suppliers believe that addressing [social responsibility] issues makes 
them less competitive” (p. 95).  Both sides collapse the regulatory activities of firms into a single 
behavior; the only question is whether the competing forces of activist pressure or costs of 
compliance will prevail.  Both sides also conceive of lead firms as having ample flexibility in 
their supply chains that they can use to reward compliance or quickly reallocate orders to reduce 
costs.  
The study of Active Inc., which we believe to be the first to analyze this broader range of 
regulatory activities, offers two useful insights to theoretical debates over private regulation.  
First, private regulatory activities within a single firm are not necessarily consistent with one 
another.  Although the compliance team encouraged and persuaded factories to comply on a 
daily basis, those same factories saw increased orders when their violations increased.  Yet high-
violation factories are also more likely to be terminated, as reflected in the history of Factory 
101, our analysis of the supply base, and interviews with managers.  These internal tensions only 
become visible by disaggregating private regulatory activities and analyzing them together.   
Second, this study reveals challenges to promoting labor compliance that go beyond a 
presumed tradeoff between compliant factories and competitive prices.  Terminating poor 
performers is costly but relatively simple to organize; it requires identifying a substitute factory 
and introducing new products to that location.  In contrast, flexibly adjusting order volumes in 
response to new violations is more complex.  It requires ongoing coordination between the 
compliance and purchasing teams, and even so may run the risk of delaying the arrival of 
products to market.   
The intensity of these challenges may vary across different supply chain structures 
(Mosley 2017).  In the case of this mid-sized retailer, one substantial barrier to using purchasing 
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to promote compliance was the structure of the supply chain, which predominantly sole-sourced 
products in long-term supplier arrangements.  This structure has its own logic to support labor 
compliance; most observers believe that stable, trusting supplier relationships make persuasion 
and exhortation more effective. However, it also meant that orders could not easily be reallocated 
to improving factories.   
This observation suggests that flexibility in supply chains may be a double-edged sword.  
Flexibility is often associated with buyers maximizing market power and increasing downward 
pressure on labor, but it also might be necessary to providing mid-range incentives for 
compliance.  Achieving such flexibility appears challenging for retailers and brands seeking to 
maintain consistency in products and develop long-term relationships with suppliers. They have 
little room to move orders out of factories that decline marginally in labor practices, and, when 
products are sole-sourced, no other factories are immediately available to produce a style if it 
were to be withdrawn.  It is also unclear whether the positive impact of using order-based 
rewards and penalties would outweigh the possible negative impact of less secure and 
presumably less trusting buyer-supplier relationships. 
Ultimately, inconsistency in buyer regulatory activities—what we refer to as “the missing 
middle”—likely contributes to the widely-recognized limits of private regulation in enforcing 
global labor standards. If factories are rewarded with access to lucrative supply chain 
relationships based upon their adherence to minimal standards, but not rewarded for incremental 
improvements in compliance, we should not be surprised that private regulation quickly reaches 
a ceiling on what it can deliver.   Understanding how to change these practices will require 
additional research on sourcing behavior and the incentives it creates for employers in the 
developing world.  
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Appendix 
Appendix Table A1: Logged order volumes and labor violations during the business relationship 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Average  0.0266  0.0252  0.0318        
violations (0.0314)  (0.0323)  (0.0196)        
Top 50% viols.  0.798**  0.803**  0.651***       
(binary)  (0.384)  (0.387)  (0.226)       
Lagged average       0.0545  0.0512  0.0459***  
violations       (0.0522)  (0.0539)  (0.0167)  
Lagged top 50%        0.948**  0.947**  0.571*** 
viols. (binary)        (0.403)  (0.405)  (0.170) 
Average unit price   .00381*** .00382*** .00572*** 0.00577***   .00288*** .00318*** .00524*** .00549***  
  (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00188) (0.00201)   (0.000811) (0.000746) (0.00164) (0.00183) 
Late delivery ratio   0.426 0.483 0.239 0.313   0.341 0.401 0.159 0.244  
  (0.417) (0.406) (0.299) (0.288)   (0.373) (0.352) (0.241) (0.226) 
Audited? (binary)     0.107 0.0912     0.165 0.178  
    (0.111) (0.116)     (0.119) (0.119) 
Purch. manager FE     ü ü     ü ü 
Factory FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Season FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
R-squared 0.061 0.071 0.066 0.076 0.822 0.826 0.060 0.068 0.063 0.072 0.832 0.833 
Factories 91 91 91 91 91 91 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Observations 496 496 496 496 496 496 435 435 435 435 435 435 
Notes. Panel fixed-effects models of the natural log of total order volume (USD) in Active Inc sourcing database.  Violations are a time-varying 
measure within each factory, averaged within each season.  Top 50% violations is a binary indicator of whether factory violations were greater 
than (1) or less than (0) the entire panel median during each season.  Lagged indicators are lagged by one season. Robust standard errors clustered 
by factory in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A2: Order quantities and labor violations during the business relationship 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Average  453.4  452.2  237.0        
violations (319.9)  (321.3)  (274.2)        
Top 50% viols.  8,263**  8,356**  6,316**       
(binary)  (3,580)  (3,587)  (2,990)       
Lagged average       955.8**  954.4**  797.5**  
violations       (424.8)  (429.7)  (326.0)  
Lagged top 50%        10,468**  10,535**  9,285*** 
viols. (binary)        (4,242)  (4,242)  (3,516) 
Average unit price   1.995 2.827 2.844 3.194   -3.162 3.256 0.115 4.491  
  (6.244) (4.501) (5.705) (4.973)   (9.129) (4.673) (7.283) (4.747) 
Late delivery ratio   4,169 4,771 5,421 6,070   5,456 6,278 6,588 8,000  
  (3,367) (3,505) (3,904) (4,065)   (4,088) (4,185) (4,906) (5,288) 
Audited? (binary)     5,147** 4,898**     3,647* 3,876*  
    (2,368) (2,328)     (2,149) (2,159) 
Purch. manager FE     ü ü     ü ü 
Factory FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Season FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
R-squared 0.039 0.053 0.040 0.056 0.178 0.188 0.061 0.058 0.065 0.062 0.220 0.222 
Factories 91 91 91 91 91 91 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Observations 496 496 496 496 496 496 435 435 435 435 435 435 
Notes. Panel fixed-effects models of total order quantity (units) in Active Inc sourcing database.  Violations are a time-varying measure within 
each factory, averaged within each season.  Top 50% violations is a binary indicator of whether factory violations were greater than (1) or less 
than (0) the entire panel median during each season.  Lagged indicators are lagged by one season. Robust standard errors clustered by factory in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A3: Order volumes and labor violations during the business relationship (apparel factories only) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Average  52,909  52,578  37,593        
violations (34,003)  (34,296)  (25,572)        
Top 50% viols.  619,483**  610,750**  494,074***       
(binary)  (244,103)  (245,715)  (172,177)       
Lagged average       94,471**  97,057**  85,500**  
violations       (43,865)  (44,831)  (36,182)  
Lagged top 50%        676,833*  677,199*  585,666** 
viols. (binary)        (335,829)  (335,039)  (239,624) 
Average unit price   1,858 -76.35 887.4 -243.9   9,576 5,568 10,245 7,991  
  (7,103) (7,657) (11,782) (11,646)   (8,393) (6,499) (13,911) (13,930) 
Late delivery ratio   471,601 391,547 475,390 386,311   1.087e+06 917,342 921,523 930,673  
  (589,352) (502,725) (667,478) (599,137)   (759,658) (586,491) (823,287) (735,481) 
Audited? (binary)     84,506 73,671     25,638 55,911  
    (95,044) (107,542)     (77,567) (100,958) 
Purch. manager FE     ü ü     ü ü 
Factory FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Season FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
R-squared 0.156 0.197 0.159 0.199 0.364 0.397 0.284 0.187 0.302 0.197 0.494 0.432 
Factories 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Notes. Panel fixed-effects models of total order volume (USD) for apparel factories in Active Inc sourcing database.  Violations are a time-varying 
measure within each factory, averaged within each season.  Top 50% violations is a binary indicator of whether factory violations were greater 
than (1) or less than (0) the entire panel median during each season.  Lagged indicators are lagged by one season. Robust standard errors clustered 
by factory in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A4: Order volumes and labor violations during the business relationship (month-level panel) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Average  2,125*  2,070*  2,163*        
violations (1,204)  (1,204)  (1,115)        
Top 50% viols.  36,987**  36,825**  34,593***       
(binary)  (14,324)  (14,277)  (12,604)       
Lagged average       1,529  1,483  1,822  
violations       (1,276)  (1,282)  (1,173)  
Lagged top 50%        28,513*  28,136*  31,011** 
viols. (binary)        (15,143)  (15,151)  (13,212) 
Average unit price   79.59 86.11 85.23 91.42   79.52 82.04 86.47 88.76  
  (58.73) (60.92) (59.25) (61.04)   (57.87) (58.96) (58.41) (59.98) 
Late delivery ratio   18,298* 18,446* 16,638* 17,188*   16,585 16,212 14,342 14,324  
  (10,942) (10,735) (9,623) (9,493)   (10,466) (10,338) (9,254) (9,191) 
Audited? (binary)     16,847 14,439     22,440 24,471  
    (26,360) (25,527)     (26,057) (26,201) 
Purch. manager FE     ü ü     ü ü 
Factory FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Month FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
R-squared 2,755 2,755 2,755 2,755 2,755 2,755 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 
Factories 0.074 0.076 0.075 0.077 0.251 0.252 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.252 0.253 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Notes. Panel fixed-effects models of total order volume (USD) in Active Inc sourcing database.  Violations are a time-varying measure within each 
factory, averaged within each month.  Top 50% violations is a binary indicator of whether factory violations were greater than (1) or less than (0) 
the entire panel median during each season.  Lagged indicators are lagged by one season. Robust standard errors clustered by factory in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Interviews 
 
To supplement the documentary and quantitative evidence, we conducted interviews with Active 
staff.  Active is a small organization, allowing us to interview all of the compliance staff and 
many sourcing managers.  Our interviews included people from all departments involved in 
sourcing (merchants, logistics, quality, and production), providing a view of the full process of 
allocating orders as well as an understanding of the compliance system.  The list below provides 
the details of the interviewees cited in the text. 
 
B01, Merchant, 12/13/2017 & 1/31/18, Phone / Active HQ, 120 minutes 
B02, Social Compliance, 12/18/2017 & 1/30/18, Phone / Active HQ, 300 minutes 
B03, Social Compliance, 12/18/2017 & 1/30/18, Phone / Active HQ, 300 minutes 
B04, Merchant, 12/19/2017 & 1/31/18, Phone / Active HQ, 90 minutes 
B05, Merchant, 12/19/2017, Phone, 60 minutes 
B06, Logistics, 12/21/2017 & 1/31/18, Phone / Active HQ, 60 minutes 
B07, Product Integrity, 01/30/2018, Active Headquarters, 90 minutes 
B08, Sourcing, 01/30/2018, Active Headquarters, 60 minutes 
B09, Sourcing / Costing , 01/30/2018, Active Headquarters, 60 minutes 
B10, Production Team, 01/30/2018, Active Headquarters, 60 minutes 
B11, Production Team, 01/30/2018, Active Headquarters, 60 minutes 
B12, Production Team, 01/30/2018, Active Headquarters, 60 minutes 
B13, Social Compliance, 01/31/2018, Active Headquarters, 60 minutes
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Active and Other Brands Engaged in Private Regulation  
The graph below shows the distribution of supply chain sizes, in number of factories, of Fair 
Labor Association accredited buyers.  The median number of factories is 51.  Active is slightly 
higher than this, with approximately 70.   
 
Appendix Figure A1: Supply Chain Size Among Fair Labor Association Buyers 
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